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Abstract 
Two experiments examined the effect of reduced attentional resources on false 
memory production for emotionally valenced stimuli using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott 
(DRM) paradigm. Prior research has demonstrated that emotional information is often better 
remembered than neutral information and that enhanced memory for emotional information is 
dependent on either automatic or controlled neural processing (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004). 
Behavioral studies designed to reduce attention resources at encoding have supported 
neuroimaging findings that indicate high arousal negative stimuli rely more on automatic 
processing but positive high arousal stimuli rely more on controlled processing. No study has 
yet examined the attentional resources required to produce emotionally valenced false 
memories. In Experiment 1, negative, positive, and neutral DRM lists were studied under full 
or divided attention (DA) conditions, and in Experiment 2, negative and neutral DRM lists 
were studied under fast (20ms) or slow (2000ms) presentation conditions. Under DA and 
speeded presentation conditions, higher false memory recognition rates were found for 
negative compared to positive (Experiment 1) and neutral (Experiments 1 and 2) critical 
lures. This is the first demonstration of which we are aware that suggests negative false 
memories are associated with automatic neural processing, whereas positive and non-
valenced neutral false memories are associated with more controlled processing. 
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The Role of Attention in Immediate Emotional False Memory Enhancement 
 
Valenced stimuli and emotional events tend to be better remembered than comparable 
neutral ones (e.g., Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992; Cahill & McGaugh, 1995; 
LaBar & Phelps, 1998; Talmi, Luk, McGarry, & Moscovitch, 2007). This enhanced memory 
for emotional stimuli appears to be quite a robust and general effect, occurring in the 
laboratory when tested using both recognition and recall (free and cued) and across a range of 
stimulus types including pictures, words, and videos (Bradley et al., 1992; Doerksen & 
Shimamura, 2001; MacKay et al., 2004; Richardson, Strange, & Dolan, 2004; Talmi et al., 
2007).   
Cognitive theorists attempting to explain the underlying mechanisms for this 
memorial benefit argue that such emotional stimuli receive more rehearsal or more elaborate 
processing when encountered than neutral stimuli (e.g., Christianson & Engelberg, 1999) and 
are likely to trigger personal relevance, which can, in turn, increase performance further on 
measures of recollection (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). Concerning the adaptive nature of 
memory mechanisms, researchers (e.g., Sharot & Phelps, 2004) have also argued that 
emotional stimuli can be processed by automatic, apparently “preattentive” mechanisms, that 
facilitate responses toward such meaningful stimuli.  
Researchers have suggested that emotion can differ in terms of two underlying 
dimensions: valence and arousal. Russell (1991) defined valence as varying from pleasant to 
unpleasant and arousal as varying from calm to excited. Any specific emotion can be 
conceived of as a pair of values on these continuous scales of valence and arousal. Variation 
on these two dimensions can cause differences in memory performance such that arousing 
stimuli, especially those that are negative in valence, lead to better remembering than neutral 
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stimuli (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; McGaugh, 
2004).  
In support of these behavioral findings, neuroimaging studies have shown that valence 
and arousal influence memory via modulation of distinct neural mechanisms. Memory 
performance for arousing (especially negative) stimuli is mediated by the amygdala-
hippocampal network. Memory advantages for non-arousing valenced stimuli are due in part 
to frontally mediated semantic and strategic processes that benefit retention without the key 
involvement of the amygdala (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006). Studies have also shown that the 
cognitive processing and neural mechanisms associated with positive stimuli are different 
than those for negative ones. For instance, Steinmetz, Addis, and Kensinger (2010) found that 
the amygdala was activated when processing positive low-arousing stimuli and amygdala 
efferents weakened as arousal increased for positive stimuli. Electrophysiological evidence 
has shown that threat-related (high arousing negative) stimuli may elicit earlier encoding 
(with amplitude enhancement on frontal sites), which means such stimuli could be processed 
unconsciously in comparison to positive and neutral stimuli (Eimer, Kiss, & Holmes, 2008).  
Behavioral research has also supported these conclusions. For example, Talmi et al., 
(2007) showed that when a concurrent secondary task is used at encoding, attention 
mediation (i.e., attention is necessary for enhanced effects on memory) accounted for the 
effect of positive emotion on memory, but not negative emotion (i.e., enhanced effects persist 
with little attention at encoding). Other studies examining the role of attention, for example 
by Kensinger and Corkin (2004; also see Kang et al., 2014), found this effect to be specific to 
arousing negative stimuli, with negative non-arousing stimuli and positive (both arousing and 
non-arousing) stimuli still reliant on controlled processing. Taken together, the growing body 
of evidence indicates that the cognitive and neurological processing of negative stimuli 
differs from that of positive and neutral stimuli. 
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We have seen substantial research investigating the role of emotion on memory. 
Typically, emotion enhances the amount we remember, but we have also been interested in 
whether it increases accuracy in what we remember. Over the past 30 years we have seen that 
memory errors can be associated with emotional stimuli (Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Talarico & 
Rubin, 2003). In the laboratory, a dominant list learning procedure that has been used to 
measure the production of so called, spontaneous false memories, is the Deese/Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Here, lists of 
semantically related words are presented to participants (e.g., table, sit, seat, couch, desk) but 
a highly associated word, the critical lure (e.g., chair), is missing. At test, participants falsely 
recall or recognize these critical lures. Moreover, when participants are asked to make 
remember-know judgments to the critical lures (where a remember response indicates 
participants can mentally re-experience the presentation of a studied item and a know 
response indicates participants believe an item is familiar but cannot recollect its 
presentation) they typically make a remember response (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  
This procedure has recently been adapted to study false memories for emotional 
stimuli (e.g., Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, & Toglia, 2010; Budson et al., 2006; Howe, 
2007; Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, 2010) where negatively or positively 
valenced lists (e.g., harm, pain, wound, punish, insult…; critical lure = hurt and hug, 
embrace, lips, peck, affection…; critical lure = kiss) are used and compared to neutral lists. 
Results vary depending on valence and arousal levels of the stimuli, however, a common 
theme is that when arousal is matched, negative stimuli produce higher false memory rates 
compared to positive or neutral DRM lists. Thus, the DRM paradigm is a robust measure of 
vivid false memories and recently, a robust measure of emotional false memories. 
There are mainly two opponent theories that explain the production of false memory 
production. Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005) posits that we store, in 
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parallel, two distinct traces of an item. The verbatim trace represents the surface form of a 
word (“couch”) whereas the gist trace preserves the meaning (“furniture from a house”). 
False recollections are based on meaning (gist) (chair was on the list because I remember 
items of furniture), especially in the absence of verbatim information. This is often referred to 
as a dual process approach because recollection of verbatim content suppresses false 
memories, whereas gist and strong feelings of presence increase false memories. Brainerd, 
Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, and Reyna (2008) hypothesised that emotional content likely 
increases false memories because negative content increases semantic connections among 
target events thus increasing gist traces.  
Alternatively, theories that are single process driven (true and false memories are 
attributable to a common process) hypothesize that semantically associated words are stored 
in a connectionist network (e.g., Associative-activation theory or AAT; Howe, Wimmer, 
Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009) and derive from earlier work based on associative memory 
structures (e.g., Anderson, 1993; Anderson & Bower, 1973; Arndt & Reder, 2003; Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Underwood, 1965). As participants view the associative items, activation 
spreads through the semantic network to related but non-studied words. According to the 
Activation-monitoring theory (AMT; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), a false memory occurs 
when participants fail to monitor the source of the activated item, and thus mistakenly believe 
the critical lure was generated externally (from the study list) rather than internally (from 
spreading activation). Indeed, any disruptions in source-monitoring have been shown to 
increase false memories further (see Knott & Dewhurst, 2007). According to spreading 
activation models, higher false memories associated with negatively valenced compared to 
neutral DRM lists can be attributed to the well-integrated and dense networks of interrelated 
concepts for negatively valenced information (e.g., Howe et al., 2009, 2010). In addition, 
because there are fewer theme nodes associated with many negative than positive or neutral 
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lists, negative critical lures achieve higher levels of activation and are, therefore, more likely 
to be falsely remembered (Howe & Derbish, 2010; Howe & Wilkinson, 2011; Otgaar, Howe, 
Brackmann, & Smeets, 2016).  
Previous research has also examined the attentional demands required during 
encoding for the subsequent production of false memory errors using the DRM paradigm. For 
example, Dewhurst, Barry, Swannell, Holmes, and Bathurst (2007; see also Dewhurst, Barry, 
& Holmes, 2005; Knott & Dewhurst 2007) found reduced false recognition rates for critical 
lures when list items were studied under divided attention conditions. Dewhurst et al. (2007) 
argued that if the secondary task is sufficient to prevent the generation of associations, critical 
lure words will not be activated and thus, not falsely recognized as often during test. There 
are some notable exceptions to this finding where instead, false recall increased after divided 
attention at encoding. However in these instances, it is possible that the secondary task was 
not sufficiently demanding to prevent the generation of associations (Perez-Mata, Read, and 
Diges 2002; Otgaar, Peters, & Howe, 2012).  
! So it appears that for the formation of a false memory, the encoding phase requires a 
certain amount of attention to allow for the spread of activation (AAT and AMT) or indeed 
the extraction of the gist trace (FTT). However, given the recent literature surrounding the 
unique brain activity and automatic processing associated with negative arousing stimuli 
(Kensinger & Corkin 2004; Kang et al., 2014), would a task that limited attention during 
encoding of DRM lists still reduce false memories associated with high arousal, negative 
valenced stimuli? We would predict that if high arousing negatively valenced stimuli could 
be automatically processed with reduced attentional resources compared to non-arousing or 
positively valenced stimuli, then participants should still be able to extract the meaning and 
activate associative connections when encoding negative high arousing DRM lists under 
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divided attention conditions. Therefore, the purpose of this current study is to examine to 
what extent attention mediates the enhancement of emotional false memories.  
We examined this using two experiments. In Experiment 1, we aimed to replicate the 
divided attention study by Dewhurst and colleagues (Dewhurst, et al., 2005; Knott & 
Dewhurst 2007) with the key modification that we included valenced DRM lists. Given the 
effectiveness of the random number generation task to disrupt attentional resources, we chose 
this as our divided attention task. Divided attention is designed to limit attentional resources 
at encoding but participants still have two seconds to encode the stimuli. Individual 
differences in the ability to carry out the secondary task might mean variation in attentional 
resources allocated to the encoding task. Thus, similar to Clark-Foos and Marsh (2008), we 
also aimed to replicate the effect in Experiment 2 using a second procedure to reduce 
attention at encoding, namely, speeded presentation. This second experiment essentially 
aimed to replicate a finding by Clark-Foos and Marsh (2008) where fast presentation at 
encoding reduced overall recognition responses compared to long encoding duration, but 
negative arousing stimuli were still better remembered compared to neutral non-arousing 
stimuli. If the enhanced emotional false memory effect for negative valenced items is largely 
due to automatic processes, then the effect may indeed survive very fast presentation rates.  
 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we compared neutral DRM lists to both positive and negative DRM 
lists (both high in arousal). We included positively valenced DRM lists in this first study to 
examine whether enhanced emotional false memories associated with automatic or controlled 
processing is mediated by the valence of the stimuli. We also used a between-participants 
factor for list type and repeated measures for attention. The reason for this was two-fold. 
First, research in the emotional enhanced memory literature suggests a possible 
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distinctiveness effect such that emotional items hold an asymmetrical competition for 
attention over neutral items (see Talmi et al., 2007; Watts Buratto, Brotherhood, Barnacle, & 
Schaefer, 2014). We wanted to eliminate the possibility that distinctiveness of the emotional 
lists was driving any enhanced false memory effect. Second, Dewhurst et al. (2007) argued 
that manipulating the attentional task condition between participants could mean that they are 
able to adjust their decision criteria in what they perceive to be more difficult conditions. 
Therefore, any effect of the divided attention task could be a criterion effect, rather than an 
effect of the encoding processes. According to Morrell, Gaitan, and Wixted (2002; see also 
Wixted & Stretch, 2000), when participants complete a recognition task, with items from 
both full and divided attention conditions, they are less likely to change their decision criteria 
during the course of a single test. Although we make no predictions of conservative bias for 
this study because of the unknown interactions with emotion type, we chose to use repeated 
measures for attention based on previous findings.  
Method 
Participants. Ninety-four participants (33 males and 61 females) aged 18-46 (M = 
23.86, SD = 7.08) took part in the study and received either course credits or £5 for their 
participation. A priori power analysis indicated a required total sample size of 90, with a 
medium effect size and Power (1-β err prob) of 0.95.  Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants and they were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment.  
Design and Stimuli. The experiment followed a 2 (Attention: Full vs. Divided) x 3 
(List Type: Neutral vs. Positive vs. Negative) mixed factorial design with repeated measures 
on the first factor. A set of 30 DRM lists (10 positive-emotion, 10 negative-emotion, and 10 
neutral non-emotional lists) were developed using the ‘University of South Florida free 
associations norms’ website (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998). Only words with at least 
12 associates were chosen. Each neutral list consisted of 12 associates to the following 
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critical lures: car, chair, foot, mountain, smell, window, pen, shirt, high, and cup. Each 
positive list consisted of 12 associates to the following critical lures: sleep, music, sweet, soft, 
love, beach, pretty, nice, laugh, and baby. Each negative list consisted of 12 associates of the 
following critical lures: anger, dead, cry, thief, fear, lie, hate, hurt, alone, and sick. The 
overall mean backward associative strength (BAS) values were 0.22 for the neutral condition, 
0.24 for the positive condition, and 0.21 for the negative condition. BAS between list items 
and the critical lure has been shown to be key to the production of false memories (e.g., 
Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001) thus it is important to ensure this is matched 
across list types. A one-way independent samples ANOVA (using post-hoc Bonferroni 
comparisons (p < .05)) showed that these conditions did not differ significantly on BAS, F(2, 
27) = 0.42, p = .66.1 Available valence and arousal ratings for the list items and critical lures 
were taken from the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999). 
For list items, there was a significant difference in valence, F(2, 27) = 122.45, p < .001, 
where negative lists were significantly lower compared to neutral and positive (both ps < 
.001), and positive lists were significantly higher than negative and neutral lists (both ps < 
.001). There was a significant effect for arousal, F(2, 27) = 7.63, p = .002, which showed that 
neutral lists were lower in arousal than positive and negative lists (both ps < .05). There was 
no difference in arousal for positive and negative lists (p = .78). For critical lures, the pattern 
was the same for valence, F(2, 24) = 155.68, p < .001, where valence was higher for positive, 
compared to neutral and negative, and neutral was higher than negative, (all ps < .001). There 
was also a significant effect for arousal, F(2, 24) = 3.67, p = .04. There was a difference 
between negative CLs and neutral CLs (p < .05). Importantly there was no difference in 
arousal ratings for negative and positive lists (p = .51).2 The means for all negative, positive, 
and neutral study items and critical lures for Experiment 1 are shown in Table 1.  
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The order of attention conditions was counterbalanced such that half of the 
participants in each list type group viewed lists with full attention (FA) followed by divided 
attention (DA) and the other half of the participants viewed the lists with DA followed by 
FA. Further, the order of list-presentation was randomized for each participant, and each list 
was seen an equal number of times in FA and DA conditions across participants. Each word 
was presented on a computer screen using E-prime, shown centrally in black, using 80-point 
Arial Rounded MT Bold font on a white background.  
The recognition tests consisted of 60 items: 10 critical lures (one for each of the lists 
presented at study), 30 target words (3 items from each list), and 20 weak and unrelated 
distractors (10 weakly related and 10 unrelated). Similar to the procedure adopted by 
Roediger and McDermott (1995), weakly related distractors were chosen from the bottom (or 
near the bottom) of the associate list from Nelson et al. (1998) but were not presented at 
encoding. The unrelated distractors were matched for valence depending on the list type 
condition (i.e., high arousal negative items were chosen for the negative-emotion condition). 
Each test employed a two-step procedure where participants were required initially to make 
an old/new response for each item, followed by a remember/know/guess judgment to those 
items they responded to with an item as old response. The E-prime software version 2.0 was 
used for presentation and data collection. 
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to either a neutral (n = 32), positive 
(n = 31), or negative (n = 31) list condition. Before the presentation of each list, an on-screen 
instruction (List 1, List 2, List 3, etc., lasting for 2 seconds) preceded each list, after which 12 
associates appeared individually for 2 seconds, with each word separated by a 1 second 
interval. List items were presented from strongest to weakest in associative strength. Half of 
the lists were subjected to FA and half to DA. For the DA condition, participants engaged in 
a concurrent task that required them to randomly generate numbers (referred to as RNG for 
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the remainder of this article) between 1 and 20 in time with a metronome in the background 
every 750 ms. Participants were told to maintain correct speed and correct level of 
randomness and to avoid counting incrementally or to follow any familiar sequences. The 
experimenter demonstrated this task before the participant began and consent was gained to 
record their number generation to allow for a subsequent calculation of the randomness of 
their output (RNG; Evans, 1978). RNG values range from 0 to 1, with lower values indicating 
more random sequences. Participants’ number sequences were analyzed using RgCalc, a 
program designed by Towse and Neil (1998).  
 After the presentation of all 10 lists, a 10-minute distractor task – Sudoku puzzles 
(with instructions) – preceded the self-paced recognition test. Before the start of the 
recognition test, participants were told that they were to make an old/new response to each 
word, followed by an additional recollective experience response (only if the word was 
labelled as old) from a choice of three: remember - if they have a vivid recollection of the 
word at study (i.e., remembering a specific detail about the word such as an image or 
thought), know (i.e., if they sense some familiarity of the word being presented at study but 
lack the conscious recollection of remembering), or guess (i.e., if they were unsure as to 
whether the word was presented at study or not, but lack the confidence to reject it). The 
responses were made using a mouse click to the corresponding labels that appeared directly 
underneath each word. 
Results and Discussion 
Random number generation task. Three participants were removed from all 
subsequent analyses as they failed to perform adequately on the secondary task. Performance 
on the random number generation task was compared across emotion conditions to examine 
any differences in attention devoted to the secondary task. Participants’ number sequences 
were measured using the RNG score and N generated and were analyzed using independent 
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one-way ANOVAs. For RNG scores, there was no significant difference between the three 
list type conditions (positive = .23, 95% CI [.20, .26], neutral = .20, 95% CI [.17, .23], 
negative = .23, 95% CI [.21, .26]), F(2, 88) = 1.57, p = .21, ηp2 = .04).  For N generated, there 
was also no significant difference between positive (M = 105.79, 95% CI [95.47, 116.12]), 
neutral (M = 104.72, 95% CI [91.88, 117.56]), and negative (M = 102.93, 95% CI [92.35, 
113.52]), F(2, 88) = 0.07, p = .94, ηp2 = .004. Therefore, for this secondary task, there 
appeared to be no differences in the attentional resources devoted to the completion of the 
task as a function of list type.  
 Recognition responses (old, remember, know, and guess judgments) to critical lures, 
list items, and unrelated fillers were analyzed separately using 2 (Attention: FA vs. DA) x 3 
(List Type: neutral vs. positive vs. negative) mixed factorial ANOVAs with repeated 
measures on the first factor. Significant interactions were explored using Bonferroni 
pairwise-comparisons (alpha set at .05). Mean proportions and 95% confidence intervals for 
the dependent measures are reported in Table 2. 
Correct Recognition. For old responses, there was a significant main effect of 
attention, F(1, 88) = 280.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .76, where correct recognition was higher in the 
FA (M = .77, 95% CI [.73, .80]) compared to the DA condition (M = .39, 95% CI [.35, .43]). 
There was no significant main effect of list type, F(2, 88) = 0.56, p = .57, ηp2 = .01, or 
interaction, F(2, 88) = 1.07, p = .35, ηp2 = .02 (see Figure 1). There was a similar pattern for 
remember judgments, with a significant main effect of attention, F(1, 88) = 218.31, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .71, with higher correct recognition levels for the FA (M = .46, 95% CI [.41, .51]) 
compared to the DA condition (M = .09, 95% CI [.07, .11]). There was no main effect of list 
type or interaction (both Fs < 1). For know judgments, there was a significant main effect of 
attention, F(1, 88) = 6.23, p = .01, ηp2 = .07, where again, correct recognition was higher in 
the FA (M = .18, 95% CI [.15, .21]) compared to the DA condition (M = .14, 95% CI [.11, 
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.16]). There was no main effect of list type (F < 1, p = .51), however there was a significant 
interaction, F(2, 88) = 3.29, p < .05, ηp2 = .07. Analysis of the Simple Main Effects (SME) 
using paired samples t-tests showed no significant difference between attention conditions for 
either negative, t(29) = .08, p = .94, d = - .07, or positive, t(28) = -1.04, p = .31, d = .32, list 
type conditions, but false know responses for neutral lists was significantly reduced in the 
DA compared to the FA condition, t(31) = -3.18, p = .003, d =  .75 . Analysis of SME using 
one-way ANOVAs showed that false know responses only within the DA condition differed 
across the emotion conditions, F(2, 88) = 3.35, p = .04, ηp2 = . Multiple comparisons with 
Bonferroni correction revealed that the responses were higher in the negative (M = .18, 95% 
CI [.13, .22]) compared to the neutral (M = .10, 95% CI [.07, .14]) condition (p = .04). For 
guess judgments there was a significant main effect of attention, F(1, 88) = 6.48, p = .01, ηp2 
= .07, whereby guess responses to correct items was significantly higher in the DA (M = .16, 
95% CI [.13, .19]) compared to the FA (M = .13, 95% CI [.11, .15]) condition. There was no 
significant main effect for list type or interaction (Fs < 1). 
False Recognition of Critical Lures. For old false recognition responses, there was a 
significant main effect of attention, F(1, 88) = 54.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .38, with higher rates of 
false recognition in the FA (M = .75, 95% CI [.71, .80]) compared to the DA condition (M = 
.51, 95% CI [.45, .57]). There was also a significant main effect of list type, F(2, 88) = 4.32, 
p = .02, ηp2 = .09, with higher rates of false recognition for negative (M = .72, 95% CI [.64, 
.79]) compared to positive (M = .59, 95% CI [.52, .67]) and neutral (M = .58, 95% CI [.51, 
.65]) critical words (p = .06 and p = .03, respectively). These main effects were qualified by a 
significant Attention x List Type interaction, F(2, 88) = 3.24, p = .04, ηp2 = .07. Analysis of 
SMEs using one-way ANOVAs showed that for FA, F(2, 88) = .75, p = .48, ηp2 = .02, there 
was no significant difference between the 3 list type conditions (all ps > .05). In comparison, 
for DA, F(2, 88) = 5.73, p = .005, ηp2 = .12, there were higher false recognition rates for 
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negative compared to neutral (p = .004) lists, and false recognition rates were marginally 
higher for negative compared to positive (p = .06) lists (see Figure 2). In addition, 
decomposing the interaction using paired-samples t-tests between attention conditions for 
each list type supported the main effect of attention, whereby critical lures were higher in FA 
compared to DA for positive, t(28) = -3.97, p < .001, d = .86, negative, t(29) = -3.34, p = 
.002, d = .65, and neutral, t(31) = -5.40, p < .001, d = 1.25 lists. For remember judgments, 
there was a similar higher false recognition rate in the FA compared to DA conditions, F(1, 
88) = 43.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .33. However, there was no main effect of list type (F = 2.31, p = 
.11) or interaction (F = .02, p = .98). For know judgments, there was also a higher rate of 
false recognition in the FA compared to DA condition, F(1, 88) = 9.69, p = .003, ηp2 = .10, 
and there was no significant main effect of list type F(1, 88) = 1.85, p = .16, ηp2 = .04 and an 
interaction that was approaching significance F(1, 88) = 2.84, p = .06, ηp2 = .06. The same 
pattern was observed in know judgments as overall old responses. That is, there were no 
differences in false recognition rates in the three list types during FA, F(2, 88) = 1.06, p = 
.35, ηp2 = .02, however negative items produced the highest know judgments to critical lures 
in the DA condition, F(2, 88) = 4.40, p = .02, ηp2 = .09, (see Table 2). In addition, a 
significant difference across attention conditions was found only for neutral lists, t(31) = -
3.17, p = .003, d = .76 , whereby false recognition rates were higher in the FA (M = .34, 95% 
CI [.25, .43]) than the DA (M = .17, 95% CI [.11, .23]) condition. Finally, for guess 
judgments, there were no significant main effects or interaction (all Fs < 1.50). 
False Recognition of Weak-Related and Unrelated Distractors. For weakly related 
filler items, there was a significant difference in list type for old responses, F(2, 88) = 7.69, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .15, with higher false recognition rates for the neutral (M = .31, 95% CI [.25, 
.37]) compared to positive (M = .19, 95% CI [.12, .26]) and negative (M = .13, 95% CI [.07, 
.20]) items (both p < .05), with no significant difference between positive and negative (p = 
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.71). There was no significant main effect of attention, F(1, 88) = .16, p = .69, ηp2 = .002 or 
List Type x Attention interaction, F(2, 88) = 2.33, p = .10, ηp2 = .05. For remember 
judgments, there were no significant main effects (both Fs < 1.5, p = .14) or interaction, F(2, 
88) = 1.94, p = .15, ηp2 = .04. For know judgments, there was a significant main effect for list 
type, F(2, 88) = 3.36, p = .04, ηp2 = .02, but although Bonferroni pairwise comparisons 
showed a similar pattern to overall old responses, these differences were not significant 
between either neutral and positive (p = .08) or neutral and negative (p = .09) stimuli. 
Finally, for guess judgments, again there was a significant main effect of list type, F(2, 88) = 
3.17, p < .05, ηp2 = .07, but only a significant difference between negative (M = .07, 95% CI 
[.03, .12]) and neutral items (M = .16, 95% CI [.11, .20]), p = .04. There was no significant 
main effect of attention, F(1, 88) = .001, p = .98, ηp2 = .00 or List Type x Attention 
interaction, F(2, 88) = 1.54, p = .22, ηp2 = .03. 
 Old recognition responses and remember/know/guess judgments for unrelated 
distractors were analyzed based on list type using one-way independent ANOVAs. Means 
and 95% Confidence Intervals are reported in Table 3. For old responses, F(2, 88) = 8.25, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .16, there were higher false recognition rates for the neutral and positive compared 
to negative items (both ps < .05). This pattern was not observed in remember judgments, F(2, 
88) = 1.21, p = .30, but it was evident in both know,  F(2, 88) = 3.19, p = .05, ηp2 = .07, and 
guess, F(2, 88) = 5.04, p = .01, ηp2 = .10, responses.  
Signal Detection Analysis. False alarm rates for recognition tests often require a 
correction for response bias, thus we also include a signal detection analysis. Below we report 
values of discriminability (ď) and bias (C) parameters for critical lures (note that better 
discrimination for critical lures, means that participants are more likely to discriminate the 
critical lure from the unrelated item) for old responses only.3 The results of ď and C are 
summarized in Table 4. Signal detection measures were also analyzed using separate 2 
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(Attention: full vs. divided) x 3 (List Type: neutral vs. positive vs. negative) mixed factorial 
ANOVAs. Similar to the false recognition response data, the main effect of attention was 
significant, F(1, 88) = 51.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .37, whereby discriminability was better in the 
FA compared to DA condition. The main effect of list type was also significant, F(2, 88) = 
19.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .30, with better memory discrimination for negative compared to 
positive and neutral lists, with no difference between the latter two.  There was a significant 
Attention x List Type interaction, F(2, 88) = 3.39, p = .04, ηp2 = .07. Analysis of SMEs using 
one-way ANOVAs [FA; F(2, 88) = 8.22, p = .001 and DA; F(2, 88) = 21.16, p < .001] both 
showed better memory discrimination for negative critical lures compared to positive and 
neutral in the FA and DA conditions (p < .05 for both), and no difference between positive 
and neutral (p = 1.00 for DA and p = .86 for FA). Analysis of SMEs using paired samples t-
tests to examine discrimination between attention conditions for each list type supported the 
main effect of attention, with better discrimination in FA across all three list types (all ps < 
.05).  
Analysis of the criterion C revealed more conservative bias for items encoded in the 
DA than FA condition, F(1, 88) = 51.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .37. There was no main effect of list 
type, F(1, 88) = 0.81, p = .45, ηp2 = .02, but there was a significant interaction, F(1, 88) = 
3.39, p = .04, ηp2 = .07. However, analysis of the SMEs showed no significant effects other 
than a trend representing a more conservative bias for negative compared to neutral and 
positive lists in the FA condition, F(2, 88) = 2.73, p = .07, with no differences in the DA 
condition, F(2, 88) = 0.36, p = .70.     
The main aim of this experiment was to examine the role of attention in the 
production of false memories for emotional and neutral critical lures. As stated in the 
introduction, if high arousing negatively valenced stimuli could be automatically processed 
with reduced attention, then participants should still be able to extract the meaning and 
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activate associative connections when encoding negative high arousing stimuli. Divided 
attention at encoding reduced old responses to critical lures but a significant interaction 
revealed that false responses were higher for negatively valenced compared neutral critical 
lures, and marginally higher compared to positively valenced stimuli. Signal detection 
analysis showed enhanced memory discrimination (more false memories to critical lures and 
fewer false alarms to unrelated fillers) for negative stimuli compared to neutral and positive 
stimuli in both encoding conditions. It appears that the secondary task had less influence on 
the recognition of negative arousing stimuli. False memory rates and, in particular, signal 
detection analysis indicated that participants were still able to produce false memories for 
negative stimuli that required fewer attentional resources and more automatic processing. 
This still allowed the semantic activation of the associative connections, something that was 
somewhat more impaired for positive and neutral stimuli. Here, we speculate that the more 
controlled processing required to encode the stimuli was hindered under divided attention 
conditions.  This finding is consistent with prior research showing that enhanced veridical 
memory for positive (and neutral) stimuli was dependent on full attention during encoding, 
although this was not the case for negative stimuli (Kang et al., 2014; Talmi et al., 2007). One 
note that should be made here is that, unlike these findings, our experiment did reveal a 
reduction from FA to DA in all list types. Although this is slightly at odds with the enhanced 
emotional effect found in the literature, we are dealing with activation of associates to not-
presented items, as opposed to veridical recall of presented items. It is difficult, therefore, to 
claim that this level of activation during DA will be strong enough to produce the same levels 
of activation as the FA conditions to produce comparable false memory responses. What we 
can show is that participants are better able to produce higher levels of false recognition to 
negative emotional, compared to non-emotional stimuli after DA. This first experiment 
provides a promising result and is one of the first to demonstrate the role of attention on 
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emotional false memory production in the DRM paradigm. The purpose of Experiment 2 was 
to enhance the generalizability of this unique finding by attempting to replicate this effect 
using a second procedure designed to reduce attentional resources at study.  
Experiment 2 
In the second experiment we aimed to replicate Experiment 2 of Clark-Foos and 
Marsh (2008) by shortening the study time. We chose to compare 20ms and 2000ms based on 
previous research examining false memory production under fast presentation speeds 
(Seamon, Luo, & Gallo, 1998) using standard neutral DRM lists.  The question here is 
whether false memories associated with negative arousing lists will still be higher than 
neutral lists with very fast presentation rates? If our conclusions from Experiment 1 are 
correct, and these effects are largely due to automatic processing of negative emotional 
stimuli, then we would expect heightened false memories associated with negative emotional 
stimuli even with limited resources available from such fast presentation rates. We also made 
two notable methodological changes. First, we only compared negative high arousing DRM 
lists to neutral DRM lists. This was because there were no noticeable differences in 
performance between positively valenced lists and neutral lists in Experiment 1 with both 
stimulus types appearing to rely on more controlled processing for false memory production. 
Second, list type was treated as a repeated measures factor. Although list type was still 
blocked, this is more typical in the DRM literature and any individual differences as a result 
of response to emotional stimuli can be eliminated using this procedure.  
Method 
Participants. Fourty-four participants (34 females and 10 males) aged 18-31 (M = 
24.10, SD = 5.02) took part in the study and received either course credits or £5 for their 
participation. A priori power analysis indicated a required total sample size of 36, with a 
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medium effect size and Power (1-β err prob) of 0.95. All participants gave written informed 
consent and were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment.   
Design and stimuli. The experiment followed a 2 (Presentation Speed: 20ms vs. 2s) x 
2 (List Type: neutral vs. negative) repeated measures design. All participants were presented 
with 20 word lists in total (10 negative and 10 neutral). The negative and neutral lists were 
taken from Experiment 1, except for the anger list which was replaced with a devil DRM list.  
The negative and neutral lists were matched for BAS (p = .65), with negative list items and 
critical lures significantly higher in arousal (p < .001 and p = .02, respectively) and lower in 
valence (ps < .001) compared to neutral list items and critical lures. 
Full counterbalancing procedures were applied. The order of presentation speed was 
counterbalanced such that each participant was presented with half the lists (five lists) in each 
list type condition at a presentation speed of 2 seconds (slow) and the other half of the lists 
(five lists) at a speed of 20 milliseconds (fast). The order of list type conditions was also 
counterbalanced, such that half of the participants began with a negative study-test phase 
followed by a neutral study-test phase. Furthermore, the order of list-presentation within each 
presentation speed condition was randomized for each participant. All words were presented 
at the center of the screen with a font size of 80 and a font style Arial Rounded MT Bold.  
Two recognition tests were created, one for the negative condition and one for the 
neutral condition. Both tests were constructed in the same fashion and were similar to those 
used in Experiment 1. Each test consisted of 60 words: 10 critical lures (associated with all 
the fast and slow lists presented at study during a particular study-test phase), 30 target words 
(3 items from each of the fast and slow lists), 10 weak-related distractors and 10 unrelated 
distractors. The weak-related distractors were taken from the bottom of the Nelson et al. 
(1998) normed lists associated with the critical lures. All distractor items matched valence 
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and arousal measures of the target items. The E-prime studio software version 2.0 was used 
for the presentation of the words and data collection.  
Procedure. Participants took part in two study-test phases, one with negative lists and 
one with neutral lists. The order of list type was counterbalanced across participants. The 
procedure for each study-test phase was the same. Before each list was presented, an on-
screen instruction preceded each list (List 1, List 2, List 3, etc.) that lasted for 2 seconds to 
regain attention. Thereafter, the 12 associates from each list was presented. The presentation 
of the lists was broken into two blocks with a 1-minute break in-between. The first block 
consisted of 5 lists with words presented at a speed of 20ms (fast), and the second block 
consisted of 5 lists with words presented at a speed of 2s (slow). Full counterbalancing took 
place, with regard order of speed of presentation, use of lists within each speed condition. 
Participants were instructed to mentally read and memorize the words and were told to pay 
very close attention before the fast lists were presented.  
After the presentation of all 10 lists, a 5-minute distractor task (i.e., Sudoku puzzles) 
preceded a self-paced recognition test. Participants were given clear verbal instructions on 
how to complete the recognition task. Similar to Experiment 1, participants were told to 
categorize each word as either old (i.e., encountered at study) or new followed by remember, 
know, or guess, if recognized as old. This process was repeated for the next list type.  
Results and Discussion 
            Recognition test responses (old, remember, know, and guess judgments) to critical 
lures, studied items, and weak related fillers were analyzed separately using a 2 (Speed of 
Presentation: 20ms vs. 2s) x 2 (List Type: negative vs. neutral) repeated measures ANOVA. 
Any significant interactions were further analyzed using paired-samples t-tests with 
Bonferroni corrections (alpha set at .025). Recognition test responses (old, remember, know, 
and guess judgments) to unrelated filler items were analyzed separately based on list type 
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using paired-samples t-test. Mean proportions and 95% confidence intervals for the 
dependent measures are reported in Tables 3 and 5. 
Correct recognition. For old responses, there was a significant main effect of 
presentation speed, F(1, 43) = 139.50, p < .001,  ηp2 = .76, whereby correct recognition of 
studied items was higher for lists that were presented at 2s (M = .77, 95% CI [.73, .69]) 
compared to 20ms (M = .43, 95% CI [.37, .49]). There was also a significant main effect of 
list type, F(1, 43) = 10.99, p = .002,  ηp2 = .20, with a higher rate of correct recognition in the 
negative (M = .64, 95% CI [.59, .69]) compared to the neutral (M = .56, 95% CI [.51, .61]) 
condition. However, there was no Presentation Speed x List Type interaction, F(1, 43) = 
3.62, p = .06,  ηp2 = .08 (see Figure 3). For correct remember judgments, a significant main 
effect of presentation speed was found, F(1, 43) = 126.28, p < .001,  ηp2 = .75, with more 
remembering of list items in the 2s (M = .45, 95% CI [.39, .50]) compared to the 20ms (M = 
.14, 95% CI [.10, .17]) presentation condition. There was no significant main effect of list 
type, F(1, 43) = .23, p = .64,  ηp2 = .01, or interaction, F(1, 43) = 3.12, p = .09,  ηp2 = .07. For 
the analysis of correct know judgments, there was a significant main effect of presentation 
speed, F(1, 43) = 10.85, p = .002,  ηp2 = .20, with a similar pattern to correct remember 
judgments. A main effect of list type was also significant, F(1, 43) = 5.05, p = .03,  ηp2 = .11, 
with more know responses found in the negative compared to the neutral condition (see Table 
5). However, no significant Presentation Speed x List Type interaction was found,!F(1, 43) = 
.71, p = .40,  ηp2 = .02. For guess judgments, there was a significant main effect of 
presentation speed, F(1, 43) = 8.11, p = .007,  ηp2 = .16, whereby a higher rate of guess 
judgments was produced for studied words that were presented for 20ms compared to those 
presented for 2s (see Table 5), a reverse pattern to correct remember and know judgments. 
Guess judgments were also produced more in the negative compared to the neutral condition, 
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F(1, 43) = 5.84, p = .02,  ηp2 = .12. The Presentation Speed x List Type interaction, however, 
did not reach significance, F(1, 43) = .002, p = .97,  ηp2 = .00.  
False Recognition of Critical Lures. For false old responses, there was a significant 
main effect of presentation speed, F(1, 43) = 40.26, p < .001,  ηp2 = .48, with more false 
responses to critical lures associated with the 2s (M = .78, 95% CI [.73, .84]) compared to the 
20ms (M = .58, 95% CI [.51, .66]) presentation condition. There was also a significant main 
effect of list type, F(1, 43) = 20.17, p < .001,  ηp2 = .32, with negative lures receiving more 
false memories (M = .74, 95% CI [.67, .80]) compared to false memories for neutral lures (M 
= .63, 95% CI [.56, .69]). The main effects were qualified by a Presentation Speed x List 
Type interaction, F(1, 43) = 4.58, p = .04,  ηp2 = .10 (see Figure 4). The Simple Main Effects 
(SME) of list type revealed no difference in the false recognition of critical lures between 
negative and neutral conditions when the speed of list presentation was 2s, t(43) = 1.58, p = 
.12, d = .25. However, false recognition was higher for negative (M = .66, 95% CI [.57, .75]) 
compared to neutral (M = .50, 95% CI [.42, .58]) conditions when lists were studied for 
20ms, t(43) = 4.57, p < .001, d = .58. The SMEs of presentation speed supported the main 
effect whereby false recognition rates were higher when the presentation rate was 2s (M = 
.81, 95% CI [.75, .87]) compared to 20ms (M = .66, 95% CI [.57, .75]) in negative lists, t(43) 
= -3.71, p < .001, d = .55, and higher at a 2s (M = .75, 95% CI [.68, .83]) compared to a 20ms 
(M = .50, 95% CI [.42, .58]) presentation speed, t(43) = -6.09, p < .001, d = 1.01, for neutral 
lists. For the analysis of false remember judgments, there was a significant main effect of 
presentation speed, F(1, 43) = 21.54, p < .001,  ηp2 = .33, with higher false remember 
judgments to critical lures found in the 2s (M = .37, 95% CI [.29, .44]) compared to the 20ms 
(M = .20, 95% CI [.14, .26]) presentation condition. A significant main effect of list type was 
also observed, F(1, 43) = 4.39, p < .05,  ηp2 = .09, following a similar pattern to old responses. 
However, there was no Presentation Speed x List Type interaction, F(1, 43) = 1.61, p = .21,  
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ηp2 = .04. For false know judgments, there was a significant main effect of presentation speed, 
F(1, 43) = 9.63, p = .003,  ηp2 = .18, with the direction of the result similar to false old and 
remember responses. The main effect was also significant for guess judgments, F(1, 43) = 
5.06, p < .05,  ηp2 = .1, but revealed an opposite pattern. The main effect of list type and the 
Presentation Speed x List Type interaction for false know and guess judgments did not reach 
significance (all Fs < 2, ps > .05). 
False Recognition of Weak-Related and Unrelated Distractors. For weakly related 
filler items, there was a significant difference in list type for old responses, F(1, 43) = 27.55, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .39, with higher false recognition rates for the neutral (M = .24, 95% CI [.18, 
.31]) compared to negative (M = .10, 95% CI [.06, .14]). There was no significant main effect 
of speed of presentation, F(1, 43) = .07, p = .80, ηp2 = .002 or List Type x Speed of 
Presentation interaction, F(1, 43) = 1.23, p = .27, ηp2 = .03. For remember judgments, there 
was a similar significant main effect of list type, F(1, 43) = 4.22, p < .05, ηp2 = .09, with 
higher false recognition rates for the neutral (M = .04, 95% CI [.02, .05]) compared to 
negative (M = .01, 95% CI [.001, .03]). There was no significant main effect of speed or 
interaction (both Fs < 1). The same pattern was observed for know judgments, with more 
false alarms to neutral (M = .08, 95% CI [.04, .11]) compared to negative (M = .04, 95% CI 
[.03, .06]) weak related fillers, F(1, 43) = 6.21, p < .05, ηp2 = .13, but no significant main 
effect of speed or interaction (both Fs < 1). Similarly with guess judgements, more false 
alarms were made to neutral (M = .13, 95% CI [.10, .17]) compared to negative (M = .06, 
95% CI [.03, .09]) weak related fillers, F(1, 43) = 11.54, p = .001, ηp2 = .21, but there was no 
significant main effect of speed or interaction (both Fs < 1). 
Paired-samples t-tests were used for the analysis of unrelated fillers (see Table 3). For 
false old responses to unrelated filler items, false recognition rates did not differ between 
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neutral and negative unrelated items, t(43) = -.46, p = .65, r =  .07, and this pattern was 
further observed in the remember, know, and guess judgments (all ts < .50).  
Signal Detection Analysis. Similar to Experiment 1, we report values of 
discriminability (ď) and bias (C) parameters (see Table 4) for critical lures.4 Signal detection 
measures were also analyzed using separate 2 (Speed of Presentation: 20ms vs. 2s) x 2 (List 
Type: negative vs. neutral) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a main effect of speed, 
F(1, 43) = 41.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, whereby discriminability was better in the 2s compared 
to 20ms presentation condition. The main effect of list type was also significant, F(1,43) = 
5.83, p < .05, ηp2 = .12, with better memory discrimination for negative compared to neutral 
lists. There was also a significant Speed x List Type interaction, F(1, 43) = 4.06, p = .05, ηp2 
= .09. Analysis of SMEs using paired samples t tests showed no difference in memory 
discrimination with 2s, t(43) = 1.05, p = .30, r = .16, but better discrimination for negative 
compared to neutral critical lures with 20ms presentation speed, t(43) = 3.11, p = .003, r = 
.43.  
For the analysis of response bias, C was greater for 20ms compared to 2s, F(1, 43) = 
41.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, and for neutral compared to negative items, F(1,43) = 4.56, p < .05, 
ηp2 = .10. There was a trend in the interaction, F(1, 43) = 4.06, p = .05, ηp2 = .09. Although C 
was higher for neutral compared to negative in both speed conditions, the analysis of SMEs 
indicated that this difference was not significant for 2s, t(43) = .92, p = .36, r = .14, but did 
reach significance for the 20ms speed condition, t(43) = 2.83, p = .007, r = .40.     
Experiment 2 showed that speeded presentation reduced false recognition rates. 
Importantly, however, during speeded presentation, false memories for negatively valenced, 
high arousal stimuli were greater than for neutral stimuli. The signal detection analysis 
supported these findings, with better memory discrimination (more false memories to CL’s 
than false alarms to unrelated fillers) for negative compared to neutral stimuli.  This supports 
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the overall findings from Experiment 1, and supports the conclusion that even with limited 
attention, high arousing negative stimuli can be encoded and associative false memories can 
be created. For Experiment 2, a similar effect was observed for veridical recognition, with 
greater correct recognition responses for negative compared to neutral stimuli in the speeded 
presentation condition. This supports previous research from the emotion enhanced memory 
literature (e.g., Clark-Foos & Marsh, 2008; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Kang et al., 2014; 
Talmi et al., 2007), and although this effect was not significant in Experiment 1, the pattern is 
similar. It may be that the speeded presentation is even more attention limiting than the 
divided attention condition, where participants may well have still been able to process the 
semantic links in neutral lists. Research has shown that the effects of organization of list 
information, that is, lists that are categorically related, can dilute the enhanced memory effect 
(Talmi et al., 2007). This is often replicated in studies manipulating emotion in DRM lists 
(e.g., Howe et al., 2010).   
 
General Discussion  
To summarize, these two experiments provide evidence that false memories 
associated with high arousing negative stimuli require fewer attentional resources and appear 
to be associated with automatic processing during encoding. In comparison, false memories 
associated with high arousing positive stimuli (Experiment 1) and non-arousing neutral 
stimuli (Experiments 1 and 2) are mediated by secondary-task performance requiring 
attentional resources to successfully encode and activate the nonpresented critical lure. In 
Experiment 1, this was examined using a concurrent secondary task that divided attention 
between the encoding task and a random number generation task. In Experiment 2, following 
a similar paradigm to Clark-Foos and Marsh (2008), attention was limited by reducing the 
exposure time available during the encoding phase. Both divided attention and fast 
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processing time produced similar results across both studies demonstrating that, at least for 
the purposes of our studies, both conditions reduce processing and attention to encoding in a 
comparable manner.  
It appears then, as has been evident in the emotion enhanced memory literature, that 
negative emotional false memories are also associated with automatic processing for negative 
stimuli. Neurocognitive research suggests that emotion modulates memory through an 
automatic route primarily consisting of the amygdala and hippocampal brain regions. These 
areas are considered to be less dependent on the availability of attentional resources (Clark-
Foos & Marsh, 2008; Kang et al., 2014; Kern Libkuman, Otani, & Holmes, 2005; Talmi et 
al., 2007). Specifically, information that is negatively valenced and highly arousing can be 
processed automatically and rapidly through this automatic route. This explanation has been 
supported with neuroimaging studies (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004), but also by previous 
behavioral studies that have shown an independent attention effect on a veridical memory 
advantage for negative stimuli (Kern et al., 2005; Talmi et al., 2007). Unlike negative stimuli, 
memory for positive (and neutral) stimuli is dependent on the intentionality to encode the 
information and thus, is reliant on more controlled processing. This result supports previous 
research (Kang et al., 2014) and the suggestion that positive stimuli require more elaborative 
processing (Fredrickson, 2004) and the work by Steinmetz et al. (2010) showing that the 
effect of arousal for positive stimuli is restricted to the amygdala efferents, which weakens as 
arousal increases. This is unlike the more widespread effect and enhanced connectivity 
between nodes within the emotional memory network for negative items (Kang et al., 2014). 
 As a side note, this biological difference for valenced stimuli is consistent with an 
evolutionary perspective on memory and emotion. Limited research has examined the effect 
of pre- and post-goal emotion on subsequent remembering.  That is, we feel negative emotion 
when goals are threatened and feel positive emotion when goals have been achieved (Levine 
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& Edelstein, 2009). In relation to memory work, research has shown that information 
associated with uncompleted goals (e.g., negative, threat-related stimuli, high in arousal) tend 
to be well remembered because they are still needed for survival, whereas information 
relevant to completed goals that are no longer needed, tend to be forgotten (Förster, 
Liberman, & Higgins, 2005). This is an interesting and seemingly under researched 
explanation for the effects of different emotions on memory.  
Drawing on theoretical models of false memory production, we can provide an 
account for the enhanced false memories associated with negative stimuli. Associative-
activation theories (e.g., AAT, Howe et al., 2009; AMT, Roediger & McDermott, 1995) 
propose that in order for a false memory for a critical lure to occur, the associative links 
between concepts/nodes need to be activated. Here, more false memories associated with 
arousing negatively valenced, compared to neutral, DRM lists can be attributed to the denser 
associative networks containing highly interrelated concepts. As well, because there are 
fewer theme nodes associated with negatively valenced than neutral information, activation 
of the negative critical lure is almost a certainty (Howe et al., 2009, 2010; Otgaar et al., 
2016). Although FTT (Brainerd et al., 2008) distinguishes between two opponent processes, 
in a similar manner, they argue that valence (both positive and negative) strengthens gist 
traces, relative to neutral content, by increasing the semantic connections among target 
events, but that these connections are more salient for negative compared to positive valence. 
Although not tested here, they also argue that low or moderate arousal strengthens verbatim 
traces, but high levels weaken verbatim traces, thus causing an increase in false memories 
(Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016).  
Both theories can account for the greater false memory rates associated with negative 
high arousal stimuli in the reduced attention condition. That is, with reduced attentional 
resources, high-arousing negative stimuli that are automatically processed should allow for 
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the extraction of meaning (or gist) or the activation of associative connections when encoding 
negative high arousing DRM lists. In comparison, the encoding of positive (and neutral) 
stimuli requires more elaborate and controlled processing, thus reduced attention hinders 
successful encoding and reduces the activation of nodes within the positive emotion (and 
neutral) memory network. Indeed, the neurobiological finding of Steinmetz et al. (2010) 
supports this pattern of results and provides an important explanation for the role of valence 
and arousal in the production of false memories. That is, negative items high in arousal rely 
on more automatic processing and that arousal only enhances connectivity between other 
nodes of the emotional memory network for negative items, not positive items. We need to 
explore this explanation further and examine false memories for positive and negative non-
arousing stimuli. However, based on previous emotion enhanced memory research (e.g., 
Kang et al., 2014), we would predict that processing negative non-arousing stimuli is 
dependent on the PFC-hippocampal network associated with controlled processing. If true, 
then we should see a reduction in false recognition of negative, non-arousing critical lures 
when controlled processing is hindered.  
All old responses required a recollective experience judgement. It is worth noting that 
more old responses were followed by remember judgements for critical lures in the full 
attention and slow presentation conditions compared to the divided and fast presentation 
conditions. Moreover, and in line with previous emotional DRM literature (Knott & Thorley, 
2014; Ruci, Tomes, & Zelenski, 2009), more remember responses were made to critical lures 
associated with negative compared to neutral list items. However, there were no interaction 
effects on remember responses and in fact, for Experiment 1, participants were more likely to 
associate old responses with a feeling of knowing rather than remembering.  We can only 
speculate why this might be. Although there are limitations with this, the remember/know 
procedure is the most widely used method to measure the recollective experiences associated 
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with familiarity and recollection (Migo, Mayes, & Montaldi, 2012). According to dual 
process theories of memory, familiarity is considered to be a rapid, automatic process 
whereas recollection is a slow, controlled process that reflects the conscious retrieval of 
contextual details (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). As familiarity is relatively automatic, any 
reduction in conscious resources at encoding leaves familiarity as the primary basis for 
responding (e.g., Jacoby, 1999). Indeed, a number of studies have shown that levels-of-
processing manipulations, including divided attention, affect recollection more than 
familiarity (e.g., Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989; Khoe, Kroll, Yonelinas, Dobbins, & 
Knight, 2000). We offer this explanation with some caution, as we would expect a similar 
pattern in Experiment 2. This may require further investigation, but Clark-Foos and Marsh 
(2008) argued that rather than a rigid relationship between emotion and 
recollective/familiarity processing, the reliance on a particular process is likely due to the 
specifics of the learning episode and the conditions under which memory is tested. 
Of note, old responses to filler items were significantly lower for negative compared 
to neutral items in Experiment 1 with no difference in Experiment 2. There have been mixed 
findings regarding differences in recognition responses to filler items for emotional versus 
neutral stimuli in the DRM literature. Previous research has shown either no difference 
between negative and neutral stimuli (e.g., Dehon, Larøi, & Van der Linden, 2010; El 
Sharkawy, Groth, Vetter, Beraldi, & Fast, 2008), or greater false alarms to negative compared 
to neutral (e.g., Budson et al., 2006; Howe et al., 2010). There are no discernable differences 
in the methodologies used, however, the relatedness of these items to the DRM lists 
themselves is not made clear and could likely be the cause. Another previously suggested 
explanation (see Budson et al., 2006; Howe et al., 2010) is that participants adopt a more 
liberal response bias for emotional stimuli. Although neutral fillers may be weakly related to 
the list items, they are distinctive from each other. In comparison, weakly related emotional 
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items, by their nature, will be more inter-related with other weak related filler items. In 
comparison to other neutral filler items, emotional filler items are less distinctive. In 
Experiment 1, item type was a between-participants factor and in Experiment 2, item type 
was a repeated-measures factor. We make this comparison because we found a lower liberal 
response bias for negative compared to neutral and positive list types using a between-
participants condition (Experiment 1, in a full attention condition), and the typical higher 
liberal response bias for negative compared to neutral list types in the repeated measures 
condition (Experiment 2). Although this particular study focuses on the role of attentional 
resources for false memory production, differences in response bias for emotional and 
nonemotional DRM lists is clearly an avenue for additional research.  
We conclude with a consideration of the forensic implications of these findings. 
Research in the emotion enhanced memory field has shown that we are better able to recall 
and recognize materials that are emotionally salient. More recent research has shown that this 
enhanced effect for high-arousal negative stimuli could be associated with more automatic 
processing (Kang et al., 2014). We have now shown the same effect for false memories. 
Thus, we may well remember emotionally arousing negative events in more detail and 
possibly regardless of any distracting scenario we encounter, but because of the very nature 
of how memory processes operate, we will also inevitably produce more false recollections 
for that event. Thus, the current research may have produced some potentially worrisome 
findings for the forensic field when memory serves as evidence. Of course, we acknowledge 
that DRM lists may not be representative of “real-life” forensic situations in which entire 
autobiographical events may be (mis)remembered (e.g., Pezdek & Lam, 2007), but the DRM 
paradigm has proven to be a useful tool to understand the mechanisms underlying false 
memory production. Research has provided evidence that, regardless of which methodology 
is used, word lists (e.g., Howe et al., 2010) or entire events (e.g., Otgaar, Candel, & 
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Merckelbach, 2008), emotional stimuli are more vulnerable to false memories than neutral 
stimuli.  
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Table 1. Mean values (including 95% confidence intervals) for List Variables as a function of Emotional List Type. 
 Negative Lists Positive Lists           Neutral Lists 
      95% CI  95% CI     95% CI 
 M LL UL M LL UL M LL UL 
Valence Critical Lures  2.25 1.99 2.52 5.95 5.14 6.75 7.85 7.36 8.34 
Valence List Items 3.10 2.74 3.47 5.34 5.11 5.58 6.96 6.42 7.49 
Arousal Critical Lures 6.12 5.28 6.96 4.57 3.58 5.56 5.36 4.47 6.24 
   Arousal List Items 5.55 4.95 6.14 4.26 3.89 4.63 5.16 4.54 5.78 
 BAS 
List Connectivity 
LSA  
.21 
1.15 
.25 
.15 
0.70 
.21 
.26 
1.61 
.30 
.24 
0.88 
.27 
.19 
0.57 
.24 
.29 
1.18 
.30 
.22 
0.93 
.28 
.17 
0.38 
.22 
.28 
1.47 
.33 
Note: M, LL and UL refers to Mean, Lower Limit and Upper Limit for 95% confidence intervals. 
  
! 42!
Table 2: Proportionate mean values (including 95% confidence intervals) for recognition responses to correct items, critical lure, and weak related lures as a 
function of emotion and attention at encoding  
 Full Attention              Divided Attention 
 Negative Lists Positive Lists Neutral Lists Negative Lists Positive Lists Neutral Lists 
     95% CI     95% CI     95% CI      95% CI      95% CI     95% 
CI 
 M LL UL M LL UL M LL UL M LL UL M LL UL M LL UL 
Correct Recognition                    
Old responses .76 .69 .83 .79 .73 .84 .75 .70 .81 .43 .36 .49 .37 .29 .46 .36 .29 .43 
Remember responses .45 .37 .53 .50 .42 .58 .43 .34 .52 .08 .05 .11 .10 .06 .14 .09 .05 .13 
     Know responses .17 .12 .22 .16 .11 .21 .21 .15 .26 .18 .13 .22 .13 .09 .18 .10 .07 .14 
   Guess responses .14 .10 .18 .13 .09 .17 .12 .08 .16 .17 .12 .22 .14 .10 .19 .17 .12 .22 
Critical lures                   
Old responses .79 .73 .85 .72 .63 .80 .75 .66 .84 .65 .55 .74 .47 .35 .59 .41 .30 .51 
Remember responses .32 .22 .42 .32 .22 .42 .24 .15 .33 .15 .09 .21 .13 .08 .19 .06 .02 .11 
Know responses .28 .20 .36 .26 .17 .35 .34 .25 .43 .28 .21 .35 .15 .08 .22 .17 .11 .23 
  Guess responses .19 .11 .27 .14 .07 .21 .17 .11 .23 .22 .14 .30 .19 .11 .26 .18 .09 .26 
 
 
Weak related lures                   
Old responses .12 .05 .19 .17 .09 .25 .36 .26 .45 .15 .08 .21 .21 .13 .29 .26 .16 .36 
! 43!
Remember responses .01 -.01 .02 .02 -.003 .04 .06 .00 .11 .01 -.01 .03 .01 -.01 .02 .04 -.01 .08 
Know responses .04 .004 .08 .05 .01 .09 .12 .06 .18 .06 .03 .09 .05 .01 .09 .09 .04 .15 
  Guess responses .07 .03 .12 .10 .03 .18 .18 .11 .26 .07 .03 .12 .15 .08 .22 .13 .07 .19 
 
Note: M, LL and UL refers to Mean, Lower Limit and Upper Limit for 95% confidence interval
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Table 3. Proportionate mean values (including 95% confidence intervals) for recognition responses to unrelated 
filler items for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.  
 Negative Lists Neutral Lists Positive Lists 
  95% CI  95% CI  95% CI 
 M LL UL M UL UL M LL UL 
 Experiment 1 – Divided Attention 
Unrelated filler items          
Old responses .08 .03 .14 .24 .18 .30 .22 .16 .27 
Remember  .003 -.01 .02 .01 -.01 .02 .02 .004 .03  
Know  .02 -.01 .06 .07 .03 .10 .08 .05 .12 
Guess  .06 .01 .10 .15 .11 .20 .13 .09 .18 
 Experiment 2 – Speeded Presentation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: M, LL and UL refers to Mean, Lower Limit and Upper Limit for 95% confidence intervals 
 
 
  
Unrelated fillers       
   Old responses .12 .08 .16 .14 .08 .20 
   Remember .02 .00 .04 .02 .00 .03 
   Know .04 .02 .06 .06 .02 .10 
   Guess .07 .04 .09 .06 .03 .08 
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Table 4. Signal Detection Measures of Discrimination (ď) and Criterion Bias (C) for correct items and 
critical lures for Experiment 1 and 2 
Experiment 1 
Full Attention Divided Attention 
 ď C ď C 
 Correct CL Correct CL Correct CL Correct CL 
         
Neutral 1.53 1.46 .06 .10 .43 .60 .61 .52 
Negative 2.10 2.03 .27 .31 1.13 1.70 .76 .47 
Positive 1.54 1.25 - .06 .09 .35 .60 .54 .41 
Experiment 2 Slow (2000ms) Fast (20ms) 
         
Neutral 1.86 1.79 .21 .24 .75 1.14 .76 .57 
Negative 1.95 1.93 .17 .17 1.12 1.57 .58 .36 
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Table 5. Mean proportions and 95% Confidence Intervals for recognition test responses to critical lures and correct items as a function of List 
Type and Presentation Speed for Experiment 2. 
 
Note: M, LB, and UB refer to mean, lower bound, and upper bound respectively 
! !
 Fast Presentation  Slow Presentation 
 Negative Lists  Neutral Lists  Negative Lists  Neutral Lists 
  95% CI   95% CI   95% CI   95% CI 
 M LB UB  M LB UB  M LB UB  M LB UB 
Item type                
Critical lures                
   Old responses .66 .57 .75  .50 .42 .58  .81 .75 .87  .75 .68 .83 
   Remember .25 .17 .34  .14 .08 .20  .38 .29 .47  .35 .26 .44 
   Know .21 .16 .26  .19 .13 .25  .31 .25 .38  .26 .18 .35 
   Guess .20 .13 .26  .17 .12 .22  .11 .06 .17  .14 .09 .19 
Correct items                
   Old responses .49 .42 .57  .37 .30 .44  .78 .74 .83  .75 .70 .81 
   Remember .16 .12 .20  .11 .07 .15  .43 .38 .49  .46 .39 .53 
   Know .17 .13 .20  .12 .09 .16  .23 .19 .28  .21 .16 .26 
   Guess .17 .12 .21  .13 .10 .17  .12 .09 .15  .09 .06 .11 
Weak related items                
Old responses .11 .06 .16  .23 .15 .30  .09 .04 .13  .26 .18 .33 
Remember .02 -.004 .04  .04 .02 .07  .01 -.004 .02  .05 .006 .08 
Know .05 .01 .08  .08 .03 .13  .02 .001 .04  .07 .03 .10 
Guess .05 .02 .08  .12 .07 .16  .06 .03 .10  .15 .09 .20 
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Figure 1. Mean proportions of old responses for the correct recognition of list items as 
a function of List Type and Attention (Error bars represent standard error) for 
Experiment 1. 
!
Figure 2. Mean proportions of old responses for the false recognition of critical lures 
as a function of List Type and Attention (Error bars represent standard error) for 
Experiment 1. 
!
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Figure 3. Mean proportions of old responses for the correct recognition of list items as 
a function of List Type and Presentation Speed (Error bars represent standard error) 
for Experiment 2. 
!
Figure 4. Mean proportions of old responses for the false recognition of critical lures 
as a function of List Type and Presentation Speed (Error bars represent standard error) 
for Experiment 2. 
!
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Footnotes 
1.! Research has also highlighted that inter-item connectivity (how related items are to each 
other) can affect the production of false memories in the DRM paradigm (McEvoy, 
Nelson & Komatsu, 1999). Thus we calculated inter-item connectivity using 
connectivity matrices, where values were available (see McEvoy et al, 1999). Although 
connectivity was slightly higher for negative lists (see Table 1), this was not significant, 
F(2, 27) = .56, p =.58. At the request of a reviewer we also calculated semantic 
similarity between list items and CLs (latent semantic analysis [LSA] cosines, Landauer 
& Dumais, 1997). LSA captures the inter-correlations between words from a large text 
database, such that the meaning of a word is influenced by the contexts (i.e., 
neighbours) in which that word occurs. The higher the value the more co-occurrence. 
There was no significant difference in LSA cosines between negative, neutral and 
positive lists, F(2, 27) = .22, p = .80 
2.! Note that the variation between 27 and 24 degrees of freedom for list items and critical 
lures reflects the unavailability of valence and arousal values for the cry, pen, and shirt 
critical lures. 
3.! Signal detection analysis calculation method and addition analysis for correct 
recognition are reported here. For ď, larger values equal better memory performance, 
and for C, values greater than 0 represent a conservative bias. The calculation of these 
measures used the common false alarm rate for unrelated lures, specific to the emotion 
stimuli type. The standard equation for d-prime is d' = z(Hit) - z(FA), z is z-score. For C 
we use, = -0.5(z(Hit) + z(FA)). Finally, the Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) correction for 
signal detection measures was applied. To prevent values of 0 and 1, 0.5 was added to 
hit and false alarm rates and the corrected score was divided by N + 1. For  signal 
detection analysis on correct recognition items, results showed similar patterns to the 
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recognition responses. Importantly, there were no interactions for discrimination 
measures that were not present in the main analysis, however memory discrimination 
was higher in the Full attention compared to Divided attention, F(1, 88) = 251.82, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .74. For List Type, F(2, 88) = 3.32, p < .05, ηp2 = .07, discrimination was 
also higher for Negative compared to Positive items, (p < .05), with no difference 
between Negative and Neutral or Neutral and Positive (both, p > .05). Similar to critical 
lure analysis, criterion C revealed more conservative bias for items encoded in divided 
than for those in full attention conditions, F(1, 88) = 251.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .74. There 
was a tendency for more liberal responses for Positive compared to Negative items (p < 
.05), with no other significant comparisons, F(1, 88) = 0.86, p = .43, ηp2 = .02. There 
was no significant interaction, F(1, 88) = 0.86, p = .43, ηp2 = .02,  
4.! Signal detection analysis for correct recognition items was also conducted for 
Experiment 2. Again, results showed a similar pattern to correct recognition responses. 
Memory discrimination was better for slow compared to fast presentation speeds, F(1, 
43) = 123.33, p < .001,  ηp2 = .74. Both the main effect of list type and interaction were 
approaching significance, F(1, 43) = 3.94, p = .053,  ηp2 = .08, and, F(1, 43) = 3.85, p = 
.06,  ηp2 = .08. As can be seen from Table 4, there was no difference in discrimination 
during slow presentation, t(43) = .65, p = .52, r = .10, but it was higher for Negative 
compared to neutral in the speeded presentation condition, t(43) = 2.69, p = .01, r = .38. 
For the analysis of criterion C, there was a more liberal response bias for the slow 
compared to fast presentation speed, F(1, 43) = 123.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .74. There was 
no main effect of List Type, F(1,43) = 2.59, p = .12, ηp2 = .06, but there was a trend in 
the interaction, F(1, 43) = 3.85, p = .06, ηp2 = .08, with analysis of SMEs showing no 
difference in response bias for List Type in the slow speed condition, t(43) = .56, p = 
.58, r = .09, and, although more conservative in the fast condition, participants were 
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more willing to response old to negative compared to neutral critical lures in the fast 
speed condition, t(43) = 2.13, p = .04, r = .31. 
